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IL YNE of the most controversial issues in the area
of international trade and finance has been that of
the relative desirability of fixed versus floating cx-
change rates. Disagreement on this issue is wide-
spread and has been, in the recent past, the major
stumbling block to a general agreement within the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding the
future form of the international payments mechanism.
This article addresses four issues related to the
recent experience with generally floating exchange
rates between the U.S. dollar and the currencies of
nine of the United States’ major trading partners.1
The intervention activities of the Federal Reserve
System in recent years are analyzed in order to get
some idea of the extent to which exchange rates have
been managed. Next, the question of measuring how
much exchange rates have actually fluctuated in
recent years is addressed. Some criteria are developed
for and employed in evaluating whether the observed
changes should be regarded as excessive. Finally, the
issue of the likely causes of the observed exchange
rate changes is explored.
~.1 / c / 4
The theoretical arguments which surround the
issue of fixed versus floating exchange rates are all
well-known and will be discussed only briefly here.2
On one side of this issue there are the fixed rate ad-
vocates who contend that exchange rate changes un-
1
1t is cnacial from the outset that the reader recognize that the
recent experience with floating exchange rates differs sigmfl-
caritly from an experiment with the pure “freely Ilnating”
exchange rates dealt with in most of the theoretical literature.
For one thing, some of the currencies analyzed in this article
were officially pegged to others during all or part of the period
covered by the study. For another, the rates have been “man-
aged
tm
’ through official market interventions rather than left
alone to float completely free in response to nongovernmental
market influences.
2
For a discussion of the arguments for and against floating ex-
change rates, see M. 0. Clement, Richard L. PEster, and Ken-
neth J. Rothwetl, Theoretical Issues in International Eco-
nomics, ed. Jesse W. Markham ( Boston Houghton Muffin
Coisipany, 1967), pp. 249-83; and Cottfried Haberler, Henry
C. Wallich, Peter B. Kenen, Milton Friedman, and Fi’itz
Maclilup, “Round Table on Exchange Rate Policy,” The
American Economic Review (May 1969), pp. 357-69.
der a system of floating rates will be largely the result
of speculation rather than the result of changes in
fundamental economic factors.8 This speculation, in
turn, is presumed to be destabilizing. In other words,
instead of dampening fluctuations in exchange rates,
speculation will make the rates unnecessarily erratic.
Furthermore, it is feared that these speculatively
generated exchange rate changes will be so large
and unpredictable as to disrupt international trade
and investment.
On the other side of this issue are the floating
rate advocates, who say that while exchange rates
will change under a floating rate system, they will
do so primarily in response to changes in fundamental
economic factors. These individuals maintain that
while speculation will undoubtedly occur in foreign
exchange markets under a system of floating rates,
such speculation will, on balance, not be destabilizing.
In other words, speculation will have the effect of
dampening fluctuations in exchange rates as they
respond to changes in these fundamental factors.4
If the empirical evidence of the past few years
shows that a significant portion of the fluctuation in
exchange rates has been independent of changes in
fundamental factors, then such fluctuations should be
viewed with concern, On the other hand, if exchange
rates have fluctuated in a pattern consistent with
changes in fundamental factors, there is much less
cause for concern. In such a case, the candidates for
government stabilization actions are not the exchange
rates themselves, but rather the underlying factors
IThe fundamental factors affecting exchange rates in the long
run are relative rates of inflation and monetary expansion.
These factors are considered fundamental in the sense that
their impact on exchange rates can be lustifled on the basis
of economic theory alone.
4
For a theoretical discussion of the question of the stability of
foreign exchange markets, see Kurt F. Hausafus, “Trade Fi-
nance, Capital Movements and the Stability of the Foreign
Exchange Market,” International Economic Review (June
1975), pp. 404-14. For an empirical evaluation of the sta-
bility issue, see Jerome L. Stein and Edward Tower, “The
Short-Run Stability of the Foreign Exchange Market,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics (May 1967), pp. 173-85;
and Michael P. Dor>ley and Jeffrey R. Shafer, “Analysis of
Short-Rssn Exchange Rate Behavior. March 1973 to September
1975,” lnsternational Finance Discussion Papers, International
Finance Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, No, 76 (February 1976).
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Table I
TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE EOR$GN EXCHANGE OPERATIONS1
March 1971 —Aprtl 1976
(MdIenn of US Dollars)
rme Total Total Net Total
P nod Porch&qse Sate, Pu elsa, a Intervention
February 1976e—Apdl9 6 $30 4 $ 2704 $ 310 5 1.8
August1975 January1976 227.2 106.5 1027 3337
Febn~oy 197 July 1975 10450 10450 1045.0
August 1974 January 975 742 3 742 3 742 a
Febr any 197 July 1974 37 5270 523 3 530,7
Au ut 97 Jaeuaryt9l4 82 2475 3367 831.7
March 973 July 1973 273 5 273.5 273 5
October 197 Pebruayl973 2150 3390 1444 5540
Aprut 1972 Sept tuber 1972 2995 417 28 3412
October 1971 March 19~72 550 550 550
March 1971 —$eptentbe 1911 7 .7 757 757
belgian Frets 0 jeans Japan s Nether and, Swuss Li K
Franc Franc Mark ‘t Guilt Praise Pond lotte
Period P P S P S P $P & P5 P S
Feb 1976 Ap I 976 $749 $ $ $173J $250.8 $$ *198 194 ~ 33.2 $ $ $
Aug. 975 Jart,1976 74,4 1497 1045 31
Feb. 197 Juy 197 29’& 45,6 7406 963 1328
Aug 974 Jan 1975 16.2 619~2 433 436
Feb 1974—i 11197 212 . 32 4698 23
Ag 1973 Joe 1974 362 33 510,8 2444 3 29
Mar I, 1973— .ttff 1973 60 470 22*5
Oct 1912 Feb 1973 300 318.6 0,4 1350
Ap 11972 Sept 1972 0,2 214 2995
Oct 1971 —Morh 1972 200 35,0
March 197 —Sept 1971 757
P Psurcllane
S 5
C tEl tab, eno ted a telyirnt tablebeanse ode elatm ~csfl lytathan a ,ftra weetvauialule,
that contribute to the fluctuations. Indeed, if e ‘- tervention. Such an arrangement has come to be
change rate changes reflect movements in macro known as ‘managed floating . In fact many advocates
economic conditions within countrie , such chang so f a freely floating exch inge rate system argue that
in exchange r’ttes have been beneficial in terms of the pre ‘ent exchange rate system has been so highly
dampening the international transmission of economic managed” that its performance is not a fair measure
disturbances.~ of how a freely floating cx lange rate system would
work if fully adopted.
Because of the sparsene so finformation relating
During the pefod covered in this article exchange to the intervention activities of the United Stites
iates weic neither absolutely fixed at an offici illy and its major trading partners it is difficult to asse s
specified level noi were they allowed to float coin- the validity of the above argument. The only offi-
pletely free of official foreign e hange maiket in cial sourc of informitson regarding foreign exchange
market intervention activities is a quarterly report
“rhis is a fu idannental as ertion of the adsocates if 1k uhlc ssued by the Federal Reserve Board of Goveruors.°
xcbange rat . The . upportnng a gunient can be found in -
M Iton Inedman Th Ca e for PIe ibl ‘ Exeha m Rate 61 his informat on cart be found in a sen s of report titled
I says Inn Positiv Fconomn s (Chicago: The 1. sisensiti of ‘ ii asury and Fed sal Re ‘erie I oreigri Fxchange Opera
Cli ‘al,o ‘ss 19o., 1 p. 1 7~ 03’ and lam C,. John on, tiou . I lies report arc usua I> published in the \lanch,
The Ca e for Flexib e Exchange Rate 1969’ this Revnew Jun ‘ Sept mber and Dec niber i sue of the I’n.de al Re
(June 1969), pp. 12~24. Sun C Bull tin
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In addition to being highly aggregated with respect
to U.S. activities, the figures given in these reports
almost completely exclude the activities of other
central banks. Since other central banks have, in
total, intervened in foreign exchange markets with
much greater frequency and in much larger dollar
amounts than the United States, the numbers pro-
vided in these reports underestimate the total amount
of intervention that has taken place. However, since
it is reasonable to suppose that the United States and
other countries take cooperative action and thus in-
tervene on the same side of the markets, these num-
bers should at least give an indication of the general
thrust of worldwide intervention activities during a
given period. The data reported in Table I have
been gleaned from the Federal Reserve reports.
Recognizing these caveats, there are still some in-
teresting patterns which show up in Table I. First,
the currencies in which the System has undertaken
the greatest amount of intervention are those that
have fluctuated the most (see Table II).~Secondly,
the total amount of intervention undertaken by the
Federal Reserve in the generalized float period (after
March 1973) is actually greater than the amount
undertaken prior to the generalized float. However,
since this observation is based on data having signifi-
cant shortcomings, firm conclusions should be drawn
with care.
‘ri~oc~p
In investigating the extent to which exchange rates
have actually fluctuated in recent years, the concern
is not with the net change in exchange rates over
long intervals of time, but rather with how much they
have fluctuated over short intervals. The reason for
concentrating on short intervals (a day, a month, or
a quarter) is that it is the short-term fluctuations
that are most often attributed to destabilizing specu-
lative forces and are of greatest concern to those
engaged in international commerce.
The daily exchange rates between the U.S. dollar
and the currencies of the United States’ largest trad-
ing partners are used to measure the amount of
exchange rate fluctuation that has actually been
experienced during the past few years. Monthly
~The interpretation of this observation is a matter of dispute.
Many floating rate advocates maintain the possibility that the
intervention itself was a source of corulnsious in foreign ex-
change markets and, thcu’efome, exacerbated exchange rate
movements. Ous the other hand, nnany analysts cnntenid that
the rates would have Iluctuated mmci more had the inter-
vc’tution not taken place.
averages of these daily exchange rate levels were
computed for the time period covering June 1970
through June 1976. and quarterly averages of these
monthly levels were computed from the second
quarter of 1970 through the second quarter of 1976.
The statistical distributions of the percentage changes
in these daily, monthly, and quarterly series were
then analyzed.5 The results are presented in Table
11~
t1
The first set of results covers the period beginning
approximately with the floating of the Canadian dol-
lar in June 1970 and ending in June 1976. The second
set of results covers the period June 1970 through
February 1973, just prior to the beginning of the
current generalized float. The last set of results covers
the period of the generalized float (March 1973 -
June 1976).
Unfortunately, there exists no consensus regarding
what constitutes excessive exchange rate fluctuations.
Hence, there is no standard against which the fluctua-
tions of the past few years can be compared. The
approach adopted here is to assume that the fixed
bands agreed upon in the Smithsonian accord rep-
resent at least a loose consensus on acceptable
short-run ranges for exchange rate fluctuations. The
performance of exchange rates over the past few
years is then compared with these bands.
At the Smithsonian meetings of December 1971,
the members of the Group of Ten agreed to permit
their currencies to fluctuate within a 2.25 percent
range on each side of mutually acceptable central
values. In other words, it was agreed that the value
of each of the currencies of the United States’ major
trading partners would be allowed to fluctuate within
t
The distributions of the absolute values of percentage changes
were also analyzed. However, there was no significant dif-
ference between these results and those of the actual exchange
mate changes analyzed in this article.
°It is usually assumed that data on daily exchange rate
changes are nonnally distributed. Furthermore, upon in-
voking the Central Limit Theorem, the same assumption is
usually made about the distribution of the changes in the
snonthly and quarterly averages of daily exchange rates.
However, the assumption of normality of daily exchange
rate changes has been questioned recently by Janice M.
Westerfield, Empirical Properties Of Foreign Exchange Rates
Under Fixed and Floating Rate Regimes,” Philadelphia Fed
Research Papers (December 1975).
An analysis of the third and fourth moments about the
mean of the data employed in this study leads to no firm
conclsnsions regarding the validity of the nonnality assump-
tion. However, as expected, the assumption seems to have
greater justification in the case of monthly and quarterly
averages than in the case of daily levels. Thus, the nonnal
model may not be the most accurate description of the
distribution of exchange rate changes. If it is not, then the
usefulness of the means and variances reported in Table
II is diminished.
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Table II
Distribution of Percentage Changes in Exchange Rates Between
the U.S. Dollar and the Currencies of Its Major Trading Partners
Time Pesod
and Nether. Switze’
Tine Inte’val Statistic Beirsum Canada Fence Germory Italy Japos’ lands land U.K.
Daily Chonqos from
Jsne I. 1970 to Mean 0.016% 0.007% C 012% 0.025% 0018% 0.013% 0020% 0.039% 0.019%
Juno 30, 1976 Std. Dcv. 0526 0.177 0.540 0.552 0465 0.446 0476 0588 0.389
(1494 Observations)
Monthly Changes
from June 1970 to Mean 0335 0.136 0 239 0507 0.387 0.268 0.415 0.798 0.408
June 1976 Std. Dcv. 2.336 0.715 2 397 2 720 2.120 1.061 2.403 2.576 1.751
173 Observations)
Quarto”Iy changes Mean 1.034 0.376 0.760 1.588 1 164 0.773 1 259 2.299 1.068
f~g:gbsori Std Dcv. 4.316 1.369 4481 5.090 4.090 3.409 4.174 4.418 3.742
Daily Charges f’om
June 1, 1970 to Moon’ 0.035 0.012 0030 0.038 0.016 0.046 0.037 0.049 0.006
Februa~yi~~. 1973 Std. Des. 0.301 0208 0.342 0.373 0.195 0.488 0.295 0.301 0245
(669 Observations)
Monthly Changes
from June 1970 to Mews 0.538 0.230 0.458 0.584 0.279 0.799 0568 0.728 0.038
Febrnary 1973 Std 0ev L255 0.766 1.447 1.286 0.601 1 844 1.335 1.798 1.296
(33 Observations)
Q~arterIyChanpos Mean 1.506 0.620 1 284 1.756 0.747 2.123 1.557 1.931 0.083
~‘ g~85~
Sta. Dcv. 2.475 1 256 2.577 2.309 1.096 3.109 2.415 2.889 2.592
Dai’y charges f’am
Masch 7, 1973 to Moan 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.013 0048 0.013 0.007 0.032 0.040
Jjn~30, 1976 Std. Dcv. 0.654 0.148 0.658 0.662 0.597 0.408 0.583 0.744 0474
(824 Obst’vat.ons)
Manttly Changes
from Marc~,1973 to Mean 0.168 0.058 0058 0.444 0.937 0 170 0290 0.856 0.775
.,no 1976 Std. Dcv. 2.952 0.670 2.969 3 506 2.705 1.968 3.027 3.096 1.994
(40 Observations)
Quartesly changes Mean’ 0.598 0.151 0.276 1.433 2.928 0.473 0.984 2.639 2.131
from II’73 to 1/76
(13 Obuervations) Std. 0ev. 5 587 1.479 5.792 6 846 5.033 3.298 5415 5.580 4393
a 4.5 percent band vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar.iO There-
fluctuation during the past few years.”
A review of Table II indicates that in no instance
did the mean of the percentage change in the ex-
other nine currencies exceed 4.5 percent over either
centage exchange rate changes exceed 4.5 percent
for either the daily or monthly data.
In the case of quarterly data for Belgium, France,
however, the standard deviation did exceed 4.5
iOWhile each currency was restricted to a 4.5 percent band
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, each could fluctuate by up to 9
percent vis-a-vis a third currency. For example, suppose
currency A was at the top of its 4.5 percent band and
currency B was at the bottom of its 4.5 percent band
vis-a-vis the dollar, If these two currencies were to switch
positions within their respective bands, the vaisne of each
would change by 9 percent relative to one another while
changing by only 4.5 percent relative to the U.S. dollar.
For these same reasons, any two currencies of the European
Snake can fluctuate by up to 4.5 percent vis-a-vis one another
under current Snake nsles. This point is discussed at greater
length in “The European System of Narrower Exchange
Rate Margins,” Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank
(January 1976), pp. 22-29.
iiThe Smithsonian agreement did not specify the uppropriate
time interval over which the 4.5 percent constraint was to
apply. It merely stated that the constraint would be bind-
ing until a “fundamental disequilibrissm” amse. Therefore,
in comparing recent exchange rate movements over specific
time intervals (days, months, and quarters) with the 4.5
percent Smithsonian band, the 4.5 percent figure insist be
taken nnerely as a guideline to what may have been con-
sidered acceptable variation over these intervals. One should
also keep in mind that the considerations which led to the
Smithsonian agreement were formed against a backdrop of
inflation that was relatively mild in terms of both levels and
inter-country differences compared to the experience which
has followed this agreement. Hence, considerably greater
fluctuations might have been considered acceptable in these
latter years. Thus, given the economic environment of the
past few years, the 4.5 percent constraint snay represent an
unduly restrictive standard of compasison.
fore the 4.5 percent band is used here as a standard daily, monthly, or quarterly intervals. In addition,
for evaluating the degree of the exchange rate in no instance did the standard deviation of the per-
change rate of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis each of the Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands,
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percent during the period of the generalized float.
In evaluating this last finding, one should keep in
mind that the currencies of these countries (with the
exception of Italy) were joined together in a cur-
rency block for much of the generalized float period.
As such, if the major block currency (the German
mark) were to fluctuate relative to the dollar by a
given percent over a given interval for any reason,
all of the other block currencies would automatically
fluctuate in a similar pattern.12
Much of the discussion about the relative desira-
bility of fixed versus floating exchange rates relates
to questions about the stability of the foreign ex-
change markets. This issue is tied to the question of
whether or not speculation in these markets is de-
stabilizing. With destabilizing speculation, exchange
rate expectations based on fundamental factors are
said to be weakly held and, hence, traders are un-
willing to take large positions on the basis of these
expectations. The resulting exchange rate path is then
dominated by price runs and bandwagon effects and
is, therefore, unnecessarily erratic.
A set of tests were performed to determine how
prevalent such runs and bandwagon effects have been
in foreign exchange markets since June 1970. These
tests examine whether the number of runs observed
in foreign exchange markets can be distinguished
from the number that would be generated by a com-
pletely random process. Such so-called “runs tests”
are useful in determining whether the behavior of
exchange rates has been consistent with the hypothe-
sis that speculation in these markets is destabilizing —
a prevalence of sustained runs (that is, bandwagons)
up or down.’3
Tab’s’ II





Doi;y 0.010 0.029 0.035
Mouttty 0058 0.070 0.042
Ouaster!y 0.114 0.392 0.212
Canada
Oai.y 0.085 0060 0.103
Monthly 0.282 0.191 0.362
Quarterly 0.381 0.163 0.603
Fran cc
Daily 0.004 0.012 0.018
Monthly 0.210 0 151 0.258
Quarterly 0.233 0.392 0.603
Germany
Daly 0.027 0.001 0.044
Monthly 0197 0121 0.242
Quorterly 0.141 0.131 0.080
Italy
Doily 0019 0.071 0.060
Monthly 0.128 0.164 0.304
Quarterty 0.218 0.174 0.095
Japan
Daily 0.0 0.088 0.031
Monthly 0.339 0.129 C 336
Ot,arterly 0.353 0.696 0.080
Netherlands
Daisy 0.047 0.052 0.039
Monthly 0010 0.050 0.042
Oua’tLr!y 0.459 0.654 0.212
Switzerland
Dai’y 0031 0.049 0.020
Monthly 0.30/ 0.222 03/4
Osartes ly 0.012 0.131 0.028
U.K
Daly 0.029 0057 0.098
Monrhly 0.395 0.302 0.430
Omorterly 0.355 0.554 0.09/
Daily I — Jurse I, 1970 -— June 30. 1976
II Juno I, 1970 —— February 28, 1973
Ill -— Masch 2, 1973—— June 30, 1976
Monthly I June 1970—— June 1976
II June 1970— February 1973
Ill —- March 1973~—June 1976
Ouosteriy I = II ‘1970- II’ 1976
II ~.. 1/1970- I‘1973
Ill lI/i 973- 1.1976
Runs tests for randomness were performed for
each of the exchange rate series discussed in the pre-
‘
2
While this observation says nothing about the cause of the
comparatively large fluctuations experienced by the block
currencies as a group, it does call attention to the possibility
that the source of fluctuations of any one of these currencies
may lie more in the fact that the currency was a member
of the block, rather than in any other factor.
~In this test a run is defined as a sequence of changes of the
same sign that is preceded and followed by a sequence of
changes of the other sign. If speculation is stabilizing, the
runs that do appear are due to changes in fundamental
factors. Since one would expect that changes in these funda-
mental factors occur on a random basis, expectations are that
they would cause neither more nor less runs than would any
random process. For a discussion of the runs test sstihxed in cedmg sections of this arucle. The results of these
this article, see Dick A. Leabo, Basic Statistics, 4th ed. tests are presented in Table III. A positive value for
(Ilonnewood. Illinois: Rnchard I). Irwsn, Inc., 1912), pp.
545-47. the test statistic indicates that the number of runs
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in the sample exceeds the expected number for a
random ordering. A negative value for the test
statistic indicates fewer than the expected number of
runs. The hypothesis of nonrandom ordering is re-
jected with 95 percent confidence only if the value
of the test statistic lies within a range of ± 1.96.
The data presented in Table III indicate that the
hypothesis that exchange rate changes were generated
by a nonrandom process should be rejected on the
basis of tins test and these data. As such, these results
permit conditional rejection of the view that observed
exchange rate fluctuations have been the result of
destabilizing speculation.
Wi~t u~t.fli~’ tk~h:tin~i.t I.7i.n:4.ac-~n~flia.t
The data presented in the preceding section cast
doubt on the view that exchange rate changes have
been the result of destabilizing speculation. However,
the alternative hypothesis, that exchange rates
change primarily in response to changes in funda-
mental factors, has not been explicitly developed or
considered.
Exchange rate theory indicates that the predomi-
nant factor determining exchange rate changes in the
long run is the degree of inflationary pressure in one
country relative to inflationary pressure in another
country.’4 This theory can be well illustrated by a
simple two-country example. Suppose there are only
two countries in the world, country A and country B.
A high degree of inflationary pressure in country A
relative to that existing in country B implies an
increase in country A’s demand for all products,
including those produced in country B. This increased
demand for country B’s products results in an in-
crease in the demand for country B’s currency in
country A and causes the price of currency B to rise
(in terms of the currency of country A). In other
words, currency A will depreciate and currency B
will appreciate.’5 In addition, if the rate of growth
1~
The future can be divided into three different time frames
the long run the intermediate run, and the short run — dur-
ing which different factors are the dominant influence on
exchange rate movements. Just where one of these time
frames begins and ends cannot be precisely specified. This
analysis concentrates on the long run only, which is defined
here as any period extending for more than a quarter.
iSIp,flationary pressures are empirically approximated by ob-
served changes in some very broad and imperfect index of
all prices. These indices attempt to capture increases in the
prices of foreign as well as domestically supplied products.
However, the majority of the items included in these indices
are domestically supplied.
Any increase in inflationary pressures will be reflected in
an increase in the demand for foreign as well as domestically
supplied products. The increased demand for domestically
of a country’s money stock plays a dominant role
in the determination of inflationary pressures, a
strong relationship will be expected to exist between
exchange rate changes and relative rates of monetary
growth.’°
The longer the time horizon, the more pronounced
these relationships will be. Inflationary pressures be-
come established only in the long run and the full
impact of differing inflationary pressures on ex-
change rates could be resisted by governments in the
short and intermediate runs. Under a system of freely
floating or loosely managed exchange rates, necessary
adjustments to changes in such fundamental factors
are permitted to occur gradually. However, when ex-
change rates are narrowly fixed or tightly managed
(as within the European Snake, for example) ex-
change market pressures are not relieved in a slow
and orderly fashion. However, once market partici-
pants sense the presence of pent-up market forces
which favor realignment, taking into account changes
in fundamental factors, exchange market pressures
surge and result in “currency crises” and sudden large
jolts in exchange rates. Thus, while the relationship
between exchange rates and relative inflationary
pressures (as measured by changes in price indices)
may not be strong in the short run, the longer the
time frame, the stronger this relationship becomes.
In order to perform a test of the relative inflation-
ary pressure hypothesis of exchange rate determina-
tion, the following series were constructed. The simple
percentage change in the value of the U.S. dollar
vis-a-vis each of the other nine currencies reviewed
was calculated over the same three time periods
analyzed in the preceding tests. The same computa-
tions were then performed for the simple percentage
changes in two proxies for inflationary pressure (the
consumer price index, CPI, and the wholesale price
index, V/Fl), and for the money stock in each of the
respective countries relative to the simple percentage
supplied products will result in an increase in the price of
those products. An increase in the demand for products
produced in foreign countries will result in a rise in the
price of the foreign exchange needed to purchase those
products (depreciation of the domestic currency). It is rea-
sonable to expect that the increase in the price of foreign
exchange (which immediately increases the domestic price
of foreign produced products) will occur faster than the
increase in the prices of all of the other products covered
by some overall price irudex, As such, it is entirely possible
that inilationary pressores will be reflected in exchange rates
before they are reflected in changes in overall price indices.
For this reason, exchange rate changes may precede the
relative movement in price indices in the short run, but this
does not indicate that exchange rate changes have caused
the movement in price indices.
tm0
See Donald S. Kemp, “A Monetary View of the Balance of
Payments,” this Review (April 1975), pp. 20-21,
Page 12FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST 1976
changes in their U.S. counterparts. In other words,
for each time period the simple percentage change
in the CPI, WPI, and money stock for the United
States was substracted from the simple percentage
change in the foreign counterparts of these measures.
A correlation test was then performed to determine
the degree of relationship between the simple per-
centage change in exchange rate series and each of
the other series described above.’7 If it is true that
exchange rate movements reflect relative inflationary
pressures and relative rates of money growth among
countries, then the exchange rate series would be
negatively correlated with each of the other three
series. That is, those countries whose currencies ap-
preciated the most relative to the US. dollar should
be those countries whose inflation and money growth
rates were smallest relative to the inflation and money
growth rates in the United States.
The results, reported in Table IV, indicate that
for all time periods there exists a statistically signifi-
cant negative correlation between the WPI series and
the exchange rate series. In addition, with the excep-
tion of the June 1970 through February 1973 period,
the correlation between both the CPI and the money
stock series and the exchange rate series is also
negative and statistically significant. These results are
noteworthy in two respects. First, the results which
cover the entire time period since June 1970 indicate
that there does in fact exist a statistically significant
negative correlation between the exchange rate series
and each of the other series, Second. there is a strik-
ing dissimilarity between the results for the pre-
generalized float period and those for the generalized
float period. This indicates that when the exchange
rates had the greatest amount of freedom to respond
to changes in fundamental factors, their observed
movements paralleled relative inflation and money
growth rates most closely. The results reported in
Table IV thus lend support to the hypothesis that
movements in exchange rates, particularly in the long
run, are determined by relative inflationary pressures





Exeharge Rates Correlation Observo.
Correuated wth Time Peruod coefficient tiousu
June 1970-
March 1976 0.7B9~ 9
Relative Percent June 1970.
Changeu iu CPI
2
Feb. 1973 0.002 9
March 1973-
March 1976 0.922~ 9
June 1970’
March 1976 Q,9453
Relatuve Percent June 1970
Changes is’ WPI
2
Feb. 1973 0.858~ 9
March 1973.
March 1976 0.946~ B
Juno 1970’
Jan. 1976 0.667~ 75
Relative Porcent June 1970.




Jun. 1976 0.8291 B
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to these results, graphic illustrations of the relation-
ships between exchange rate changes and the relative
inflation and money growth series during the gen-
eralized float are presented in Chart I,
The observed negative correlation between relative
rates of inflation and exchange rate changes says
nothing about the direction of causality which under-
lies this relationship. Some analysts claim, for ex-
ample, that changes in exchange rates “cause” changes
in relative rates of inflation. However, evidence in
favor of the alternative argument, that exchange rate
changes were “caused” by the differences in inflation
rates, is given by the last set of results in Table IV.
One body of economic thought holds that relative
rates of monetary expansion are the predominant
factor in explaining relative rates of inflation in the
long run. Applied to the argument advanced in this
article, this view implies a strong negative corre-
lation between exchange rate movements and relative
rates of money growth, as shown in Table IV. On
the other hand, the argument that changes in cx-
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The same test which led to the results presented in Table
IV was conducted using data for all OECD member countries
for which data are currently available. This same test
was also performed using data for all of the 46 IMF
member countries which account for about 90 percent of
total U.S. trade and for which data are currently available.
The results of both tests were virtually identical in their
implications, if not in their exact numerical value, with those
presented in Table IV. Thus, the conclusions drawn from
Table IV do not appear to be sensitive to the sample of
countries chosen, for analysis.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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change rates “cause” inflation offers no explanation
of these results.10
t4fVr7AAC
The thrust of this article has been an empirical
review of the recent experience with generally
20 floating exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and
the currencies of the United States’ major trading
to partners. The evidence presented herein casts doubt
on the view that exchange rate changes are the result
of destabilizing speculation, even in the short run.
It is also demonstrated that in the long run exchange
rates have changed in a pattern consistent with
changes in fundamental economic factors.
An implication of these findings is that the pros-
pects for a return to a viable fixed exchange rate
30 regime are remote as long as there remains as wide
a spectrum of economic policies among countries
as has been the case for the past few years. The
unacceptability of such a regime has been amply
demonstrated recently by the futile efforts to hold
10 together the European Currency Snake and the vir-
tual abandonment by the Common Market of any
O plans for a closer Economic and Monetary Union.
It is no coincidence that all hut one large country
.50 departed from the Snake and that the dream of an
economically united Europe vanished simultaneously.
The reason is that the Common Market countries
have recognized that no country that believes it has
50 an option will be willing to subjugate its own eco-
nomic policies to the monetary discipline practiced in
4° another country (in the current situation the other
country is West Germany). These experiences amply
demonstrate that the time has not yet arrived for the
20 kind of economic policy coordination that a fixed
exchange rate system requires. While such coordina-
20 tion may or may not be a laudable goal to strive for,
the world should accept the facts as they currently
0 are and admit that, as of now, such an arrangement
is nowhere in sight.
0 ‘9For some samples of other recent studies which arrive at the
same conclusion regarding the relative inflation and money
growth rate hypothesis of exchange rate determination, see
10 David Kern, “Inflation Implications irs Foreign Exchange
Rate Forecasting,” Euronwney (April 1976), pp. 62-69; and
D. King, “The Perfonnance of Exchange Rates in the Recent
Period of Floating: Exchange Rates and Relative Rates of
Inflation,” unpublished memorandum (New York: Foreign
Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
March 15, 1976). King’s work also provides some evidence
favoring the inflation to depreciation direction of causality.
For an analysis of an earlier period of floating rates, see
John S. Hodgson, “An Analysis of Floating Exchange Rates:
The Dollar— Sterling Rate, 1919-1925,” The Southern
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